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 and Marco Pleßner*, University of Kassel 
Abstract 
By extending a typical endowment effect experiment with the possibility to win the endow-
ment in a real effort contest, we found two enforcing effects that led to a complete market 
failure. Subjects who won the item in the competition had an extremely high willingness to 
accept (trophy effect). By contrast, subjects who were not successful had an extremely low 
willingness to pay for the same item (reverse trophy effect). We disentangle the different 
components of the trophy effect, compare it to similar experiments, and discuss its important 
economic implications.  
1. Introduction 
Imagine you play in a tennis tournament at your local club. As your opponents are of the same 
strength as you, playing the matches is hard work. Now imagine you have managed to win the 
tournament and the prize is a trophy which is sold for 5 € at a local shop. For how much are 
you willing to sell this trophy? How much might your opponents be willing to pay for this 
trophy? 
If there is a big discrepancy between the first and second answer, we have found an example 
in which a market for this trophy is at least imperfect. In our paper, we will show that markets 
for “trophies” can completely fail. Thereby, we show that everyday market items can turn into 
such trophies. Further, we will separate different elements of the trophy effect, which is based 
on the well-known endowment effect (Thaler 1980). 
The endowment effect is among the most robust phenomena in behavioral economics. Usual-
ly, the mean willingness to accept (WTA) for convenience goods exceeds the mean willing-
ness to pay (WTP) by a factor of two (Irwin 1994, Tversky and Kahneman 1992). However, 
higher ratios can be observed, especially in field studies: e.g., exceeding fourteen in the case 
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of basketball tickets (Carmon and Ariely 2000). A key question to ask is what determinants 
actually influence the size of the gap between WTA and WTP. Keeping income effects con-
stant, Haneman (1991) showed that the fewer substitutes which are disposable for a good, the 
greater the difference between WTA and WTP. Zhang and Fischbach (2005) argued that such 
discrepancies are strongly affected by subjects’ moods: They found that the gap between 
WTA and WTP diminishes under positive mood conditions and that it is amplified by nega-
tive moods. Moreover, people act more generously and take more chances when spending 
“other people’s money”, which leads to smaller WTA-WTP gaps in experimental settings 
(Cherry et al. 2005). 
Apart from these determinants, there are copious factors that might also contribute to the feel-
ing of being attached to an object, e.g., the result of labor. A lot of real effort experiments 
already exist: Fahr and Irlenbusch (2000) used it in trust games, Ball et al. (2001) for experi-
mental auctions and Hofmann and Spitzer (1985) in experiments on cooperative game theory. 
However, until today the effect of earned endowment has primarily been tested in settings 
different from those used in the present study. For instance, Cherry et al. (2005) designed a 
real effort experiment to explore the effect of earned endowments on observed contributions 
to a public good. Participants had to earn money by taking part in a quiz containing 
17 questions taken from the Graduate Management Admission Test (GMAT). Their results 
suggest that participants contributed about the same to the public good whether their endow-
ments were earned or not, indicating that the origin of endowment has no significant effect. 
Hoffman et al. (1994) analyzed earned endowments in the dictator game and ultimatum game. 
They showed that participants who worked for their proposer position by achieving high test 
results in a general knowledge quiz behaved in a more self-regarding manner. Namely, they 
tried to take advantage of their first mover position by offering significantly less to the res-
ponder compared to subjects in standard settings. This means that earning one’s position can 
lead to higher egoism in bargaining games. 
The set-up used by Hoffman et al. (1994) served as an inspiration for the current study: In our 
experiment, subjects had to work in order to become endowed with an item. They had to 
strain themselves to get into a seller position. The experiment described in this study reveals 
significantly higher ownership utility for participants who had to work for the traded good. 
Specifically, subjects took part in a mathematics test. Those who attained better results than 
the median were endowed with a pen. Subsequently, they stated WTAs that were excessively 
high. We call this pattern the “trophy effect”. 3 
 
The trophy effect substantially exceeds the ordinary endowment effect exhibited in our con-
trol group. Therefore, sellers did not value their pens more than buyers merely due to the extra 
utility caused by being its owner. They seemed to incorporate the work and the feeling of be-
ing a winner of the difficult competition into the items. These factors lead to a large increase 
in their WTAs, making their “trophies” unsalable. The trophy effect is a new phenomenon 
with organizational and managerial implications that can be far-reaching. 
Our findings can be compared to a recent study conducted by Norton et al. (2010), who sug-
gested that labor “leads to love” for the object it is successfully performed on. When people 
design and construct products by themselves, they tend to overvalue their creations. Norton 
(2009) labeled this phenomenon the “IKEA effect”. The IKEA effect is closely related to the 
traditional endowment effect and the trophy effect. Norton and his coauthors asked their par-
ticipants to fold origami and to bid on their own creations as well as on those of other partici-
pants. All subjects were willing to pay significantly more for their own work. Furthermore, 
they preferred their own creations to origami folded by experts. The biggest difference from 
the trophy effect is that the work in Norton’s IKEA effect is directly performed on the valued 
object itself, whereas the work to attain a trophy is usually accomplished in an unrelated com-
petition. 
The remainder of our paper is as follows: Section 2 describes the experimental settings that 
analyze the trophy effect. In section 3, we derive our hypotheses; section 4 describes the data 
and tests these hypotheses. In section 5 we call attention to the implications of the trophy ef-
fect, discuss our findings, and give an outlook for possible future research. 
2. Experiment 
The experiment was carried out as part of the master course (M.A. in Economics) “Quantita-
tive methods of experimental economics” at the University of Kassel, Germany. It was con-
ducted in the summer semesters of 2010 and 2011. Altogether, it involved 76 students, major-
ing in either economics or business administration, who had already taken part in one en-
dowment effect experiment. Thus, they had market experience and knew how the market 
clearing price materialized.
1
                                                       
1 The findings offered by List (2003) and Coursey et al. (1987) indicate that the endowment effect is eliminated 
with experience, suggesting that value disparities are an artifact of the lack of market experience. In our setting, 
the endowment effect and the even more intense trophy effect persist although all participants had taken part in 
market experiments before. Thus, the results of the present study take a similar line as Harbaugh et al. (2001), 
who ran a series of experimental tests on this topic with people, primarily children and students, in different age 
 Test subjects were made aware that all their pricing decisions 4 
 
were binding and that transactions would be realized with their own money in order to render 
the market settings as realistic as possible. 
To clarify the different components of the trophy effect, we used four treatments: the baseline 
(or control) treatment that tests the ordinary endowment effect; our trophy treatment that tests 
the combined effect of work and winning; and two further control treatments that separately 
analyze the effect of winning and the effect of work on valuation. 
Baseline Treatment 
Our baseline-treatment design mainly resembles the one chosen by Kahneman et al. (1990). 
This control group consisted of 18 members. Buyers received a set of instructions on distri-
buted forms (distinctions for sellers in parentheses).  
•  In this market, the objects being traded are ball-point pens.
2
•  Please enter a price up to which you are willing to buy the pen in the field below. 
(Please enter a price from which you are willing to sell the pen in the field below.) It 
has to be between 0 and 5.0 € and should only have one decimal place. Possible prices 
are thus 0.1 €, 0.2 €, ... , 4.9 €, 5.0 €. The transactions will take place after the experi-
ment. You can voluntarily explain your pricing decision on the back of the question-
naire. 
 You do not own a pen, so 
you are a buyer. (You now own the pen in front of you, so you are a seller.) You pur-
chase a pen in the case that the price which is determined later in the experiment is ac-
ceptable to you. (You sell your pen in the case that the price which is determined later 
in the experiment is acceptable to you.) 
Trophy Treatment 
Students of the trophy treatment group (n=20) had to complete an elementary mathematics 
test within 15 minutes. It was brought to their attention that only the ten best students would 
be rewarded with a ball-point pen afterwards. After the test was given, the answers were col-
lected and the ten best students were determined, all participants got the following instruc-
tions. Those who were rewarded with a pen became sellers, whereas students whose results 
were below the median got the chance to buy a pen. The forms for buyers were worded as 
follows (differences for sellers in parentheses): 
                                                                                                                                                                      
groups. They found that even large increases in age – and therefore in market experience – do not reduce the 
endowment effect at all. 
 
2 The ball-point pens were available for 2.10 € at the nearby campus store. 5 
 
•  In this market, the objects being traded are ball-point pens. You do not own a pen, so 
you are a buyer. (You have acquired the pen in front of you for your good results in 
the mathematics test, so you are a seller.) You purchase a pen in the case that the price 
which is determined later in the experiment is acceptable to you. (You sell your pen in 
the case that the price which is determined later in the experiment is acceptable to 
you.) 
•  Please enter a price up to which you are willing to buy the pen in the field below. 
(Please enter a price from which you are willing to sell the pen in the field below.) It 
has to be between 0 and 5.0 € and should only have one decimal place. Possible prices 
are thus 0.1 €, 0.2 €, ... , 4.9 €, 5.0 €. The transactions will take place after the experi-
ment. You can voluntarily explain your pricing decision on the back of the question-
naire. 
Work Treatment 
In this treatment (n=16), the group of sellers also had to solve a mathematics test within 15 
minutes. In contrast to the trophy treatment, all presumptive sellers were remunerated with a 
pen for their efforts after the test, regardless of their results. Again, each buyer and seller re-
ceived a form (instructions for sellers in parentheses): 
•  In this market, the objects being traded are ball-point pens. You do not own a pen, so 
you are a buyer. (You now own the pen you worked for in the mathematics test, so 
you are a seller.) You purchase a pen in the case that the price which is determined 
later in the experiment is acceptable to you. (You sell your pen in the case that the 
price which is determined later in the experiment is acceptable to you.) 
•  Please enter a price up to which you are willing to buy the pen in the field below. 
(Please enter a price from which you are willing to sell the pen in the field below.) It 
has to be between 0 and 5.0 € and should only have one decimal place. Possible prices 
are thus 0.1 €, 0.2 €, ... , 4.9 €, 5.0 €. The transactions will take place after the experi-
ment. You can voluntarily explain your pricing decision on the back of the question-
naire. 
Lottery Treatment  
Another fraction of the participants (n=22) took part in an explicit lottery. They were told that 
they had a 50% chance of winning a ball-point pen by drawing a ticket. The winners were 
subsequently endowed with a pen and became sellers. The other half assumed the role of buy-6 
 
ers in this market. After the winners were determined and the items were handed over, buyers 
and sellers received the following forms (instructions for sellers in parentheses): 
•  In this market the objects being traded are ball-point pens. You do not own a pen, so 
you are a buyer. (You have won the pen in front of you in the lottery, so you are a sel-
ler.) You purchase a pen in the case that the price which is determined later in the ex-
periment is acceptable to you. (You sell your pen in the case that the price which is de-
termined later in the experiment is acceptable to you.) 
•  Please enter a price up to which you are willing to buy the pen in the field below. 
(Please enter a price from which you are willing to sell the pen in the field below.) It 
has to be between 0 and 5.0 € and should only have one decimal place. Possible prices 
are thus 0.1 €, 0.2 €, ... , 4.9 €, 5.0 €. The transactions will take place after the experi-
ment. You can voluntarily explain your pricing decision on the back of the question-
naire. 
3. Hypotheses 
The predictive theory to be tested in the experiments described above can be summarized by 
the following hypotheses. In our experimental setting, the presumably positive effect of labor 
on people’s valuations for a good was examined (cf. Norton 2009). Furthermore, the sellers in 
the trophy treatment may have felt like winners for being rewarded with items, which might 
have led to increasing their WTA even more. Frey and Neckermann (2008, p. 199) argue that 
“working towards an award generates procedural utility.”
3
Trophy Effect 
 Thus, the hypothesis to test the 
trophy effect can be written as follows: 
  If people work successfully and are rewarded for this with an item, they tend to overva-
lue it.  
(Null hypothesis: WTAtrophy=WTAbaseline; alternative hypothesis: WTAtrophy>WTAbaseline) 
While analyzing the effect of awards in economic surroundings, one intuitively focuses on 
those who were  rewarded. But what about those who come away empty-handed? These 
people with no reward might feel like losers, which could have negative consequences with 
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under institutionalized processes as they contribute to a positive sense of self, addressing innate needs of auton-
omy, relatedness, and competence.” 7 
 
respect to their achievement motivation (Frey and Neckermann 2008). Moreover, Norton et 
al. (2010) state that labor only leads to an increase in valuation if it is fruitful; additionally, 
according to Bandura (1977), the successful completion of tasks is a means by which people 
can achieve their goal to feel competent. Alternatively, Zeigarnik (1935) notes that subjects 
dwell on tasks they failed to bring to a favorable conclusion. In our experimental design, these 
factors might have consequences for participants whose test results were below the median 
and who therefore did not get a pen. 
The pen might be regarded as a symbol of defeat which reminds the participants of their un-
derperformance during the test, leading to frustration that precipitates a refusal to buy one. 
Accordingly, the reverse trophy effect would reveal a mean WTP articulated by members of 
the experimental group which lies below the average WTP elicited in the baseline treatment. 
Reverse Trophy Effect 
  Unsuccessful labor induces a decrease in valuation of the object one worked for.  
(Null hypothesis: WTPtrophy=WTPbaseline; alternative hypothesis: WTPtrophy<WTPbaseline) 
As mentioned above, we also tried to isolate the different components of the trophy effect, 
namely the effect of work and the effect of winning. The potentially positive effect of labor on 
valuation was tested in the work treatment. Presumptive sellers also had to strain themselves 
in a mathematics test and were subsequently endowed with pens, independent from their test 
results. If work generally has a positive effect on valuation, the WTA elicited in the work 
treatment should substantially exceed the WTA determined in the baseline treatment. 
Work Effect 
  If people work in order to obtain an item, they are inclined to overvalue it.  
(Null hypothesis: WTAwork=WTAbaseline; alternative hypothesis: WTAwork>WTAbaseline) 
Furthermore, we claim that winning in itself is a component of a subject's utility. Results of 
recently conducted experiments have shown that subjects might care about winning per se 
(Sheremeta 2010). Goeree et al. (2002) directly addressed the utility of winning. They found 
that overbidding in auctions suggests the presence of an upward bias which can either be 
caused by risk aversion or a “joy of winning”. By the latter they mean that a subject’s utility is 
increased if he or she makes money in an auction. Further studies referring to the utility of 
winning are Herrmann and Orzen (2008) and Cox et al. (1988). Thus, in the context of our 8 
 
experimental tests, winning an item in an explicit lottery might induce a higher valuation for 
the prize than the traditional endowment effect generally evokes. 
Lottery Effect 
  If people win an item in an explicit lottery, they overestimate its value. 
(Null hypothesis: WTAlottery=WTAbaseline,; alternative hypothesis: WTAlottery>WTAbaseline) 
4. Results 
Table 1 summarizes our main results. In every market, we found an endowment effect, i.e., 
the WTAs differ significantly from the corresponding WTPs. Comparing the sizes of these 
effects is even more interesting. In the baseline treatment, we replicated the results of pre-
vious endowment effect experiments (Kahneman et al. 1991). The mean WTA (2.86 €) ex-
ceeded the mean WTP by slightly more than a factor of 2 and 40% of the theoretically ex-
pected market transactions took place. The market equilibrium price resembled the true price 
of the pen.  
When making the lottery to become  a seller explicit by drawing lottery tickets,  the 
WTA/WTP-ratios increased slightly. However, the average WTAlottery and WTPlottery were not 
significantly different from the baseline treatment. This did not change in the work treatment, 
although the average WTA increased to 3.58 € when the subjects had to work for the traded 
good.
4
The only significant differences to the ordinary endowment effect of our baseline treatment 
can be observed in the trophy treatment where subjects had to work for the feeling of being a 
winner. Thereby, the lottery effect and the work effect seem to add up. Participants who were 
rewarded for their good work in the mathematics test had a mean WTA that was much higher 
than the mean WTAbaseline (trophy effect). On average, they only wanted to accept offers of 
4.40 € for a pen that you can buy for 2.10 € at the campus store. By contrast, participants of 
the mathematics test that did not manage to get a pen had much lower WTPs than the WTPs 
 
                                                       
4 Here it is interesting to recall the prediction bias coined by Lowenstein and Adler (1995). They found that 
people systematically misjudge future utility due to underestimating the impact of ownership. In other words, 
people seem to be unable to predict the endowment effect. Our findings confirm that this prediction bias also 
holds for the impact of work. Before taking part in the mathematics test, presumptive sellers were asked to pre-
dict their own valuation for the pens. On average they indicated an anticipated WTA of 1.90 €, whereas they 
stated an actual mean WTA of 3.58 € a few minutes later. This discrepancy was found to be highly significant 
(p=0.018, Wilcoxon signed rank test), suggesting a bias in predicting one’s preferences also in light of the work 
effect. 9 
 
of the baseline treatment – the median WTP of the trophy market was 0.50 € and the median 
WTP of the baseline market was 1 € (reverse trophy effect). These two effects amplify the 
endowment effect, resulting in an unusually high ratio of median WTA/median WTP of 9.6 
for an everyday market item, and a total collapse of the market! 
Table 1: Summary of the Treatment Results 
  N  equilibrium 
 
WTA   WTP  WTA/WTP 
∑76  quantity   price  mean  median  mean  median  means  medians 
baseline  ∑18  2  2.00 €  2.86 €  3.00 €  1.26 €  1.00 €  2.27  3.00 
lottery  ∑22  2   2.33 €  3.43 €  3.30 €  1.23 €  0.90 €  2.79  3.67 
work  ∑16  1   2.32 €  3.58 €  3.50  €  1.19 €  0.95 €  3.01  3.68 
trophy  ∑20  -  -  4.40
##€  4.80*€  0.57
#€  0.50*€  7.72  9.60 
Notes: * Significantly different (p<0.05) from the baseline treatment (two-sided Mann-Whitney U test) 
 # Significantly different (p<0.05) from the baseline treatment (LSD post hoc test after ANOVA
5
           
## Significantly different (p<0.01) from the baseline treatment (LSD post hoc test after ANOVA) 
) 
Figure 1 illustrates the complete market failure in our trophy treatment. Whereas in the base-
line treatment at least two transactions took place, the demand curve of the trophy treatment 
did not intersect the supply curve at all. The behavior and feedback of our participants strong-
ly support the trophy idea: One participant stated to feel strongly attached to the pen because 
she earned it and therefore chose the highest selling price possible. Thus, being awarded for 
one’s good work can turn a mere pen into a trophy. The feeling of being a winner alone and 
the effort alone cannot induce such a strong effect. With regard to the latter aspect, it is impor-
tant to notice that on average the effort in the mathematics tests of the work and trophy treat-
ments (measured by points scored) were nearly identical. 
Figure 1 also shows the reverse trophy effect: When you lose in an effortful competition, you 
do not want to be reminded of it. Almost defiantly, our subjects expressed WTPs that are 
much smaller than the WTPs of the baseline treatment and on average differ greatly from the 
true buying price. 
                                                       
5 Conditions for the ANOVA: Kolmogorov-Smirnov tests within the groups could not reject the null hypothesis 
that the data are normally distributed (p>0.59). Levene tests could not reject the null hypothesis that the va-
riances within the treatments are homogeneous (p=0.46 for the WTA groups and p=0.22 for the WTP groups). 
The group sizes were similar.  
The F-test of the ANOVA was significant for the WTA groups (p=0.038) and insignificant for the WTP groups 
(p=0.189). The nonparametric Kruskal-Wallis test was significant for both the WTA- and WTP-comparisons 
(p=0.031 for the WTA groups and p=0.096 for the WTP groups).  10 
 
Figure 1: Trophy Effect 
Note: WTA sorted from highest to lowest; WTP sorted from lowest to highest 
5. Discussion 
According to the trophy effect, successful labor one is rewarded for creates economic value 
for the worker. The trophy effect implies that people tend to overvalue “trophies” they had to 
work for in order to obtain them. The intensity of this effect might even be enforced by cere-
moniously  handing over the objects participants had to work for. Dufwenberg and Mu-
ren (2005) tested participants’ reactions in a dictator game for this impact. Their results reveal 
that dictators give significantly less when they are remunerated in front of others rather than 
in private. Thus, awarding the best students in the mathematics test with their “trophy” in 
front of the group could lead to enhancing their valuation even more, presumably inducing a 
higher WTA on average. 
Strongly related phenomena to the trophy effect are the already mentioned IKEA effect (Nor-
ton et al. 2010) and the “I designed it myself” effect in mass customization. Franke et al. 
(2010) defined the latter as the increase in value a subject attributes to self-designed objects 
which solely arises from the fact that she feels like the creator of the good. The big difference 
between the trophy effect and its two counterparts is that the work in the trophy effect is not 
invested in the good itself. Whereas in our trophy experiment people’s successful work in-
creases the valuation of the award (and decreases the valuations from unsuccessful workers 
for the same item), the IKEA and “I designed it myself” effects comprise people’s overvalua-
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In future research, the trophy effect and the closely related IKEA effect need to be sharply 
delineated. For instance, one could compare the valuations of subjects that win an already 
constructed Billy shelf in an unrelated competition to those of subjects that win a Billy shelf 
after constructing it on their own.  
What the trophy and the IKEA effects have in common is that they provide very important 
marketable implications. For instance, in the 1950s cake mixes were introduced (Shapi-
ro 2004, Norton 2009). These ready-mixes were very simple, allowing even un-experienced 
cooks to prepare delicious pastries within minutes. Housewives regarded these mixtures as a 
humiliation since their labor was not adequately valued. Hence, they simply did not buy these 
products. Manufactures reacted to this problem by changing the mixes. The new cake mixes 
involved the addition of eggs etc. Surprisingly, this increase in the work required led to a 
greater acceptance. 
Plenty of firms have since then begun to commercialize user design, e.g., by offering websites 
which allow customers to design their own individual kitchens, sneakers or shirts online. The-
reby, the company can produce customized products in accordance with their customers’ 
wishes (Dellaert and Stremersch 2005, Randall et al. 2005).  The economic value of such 
products created via mass customization has been assigned to two factors (Franke et al. 2010): 
on the one hand, the achieved preference fit (which ought to be high) and on the other hand, 
the effort of customers who help design their products (which ought to be low). Franke et al. 
provided  experimental evidence which indicates that besides these two aspects,  the mere 
awareness of being the originator of a good creates economic value for customers, inducing a 
substantially higher WTP. The intensity of this effect is associated with feelings of accom-
plishment and the individual’s apprehended contribution to the production flow. 
The effect of successful labor on valuation has also implications for organizational dynamics 
and innovation management (cf. Norton et al. 2010). For instance, managers might proceed to 
use more resources for projects in which they have already invested a lot of work (IKEA ef-
fect) or for which they had to work hard to become the project leader (trophy effect). This 
phenomenon contributes to the sunk-cost effect (Arkes and Blumer 1985), which implies that 
people frequently act irrationally by allowing irreparable investments to affect their judg-
ments. In this connection, projects might be completed although they are expected to fail, 
leading to a waste of resources and to inhibiting innovation (Biyalogorsky et al. 2006).  12 
 
Moreover, the trophy effect might contribute to the “Not-Invented-Here” syndrome, docu-
mented by Katz and Allen (1982), which essentially describes the phenomenon that managers 
and companies sometimes avoid buying or implementing already existing ideas or products 
due to their external origin. In an extreme case, the trophy effect could lead to a complete re-
jection of ideas developed elsewhere, although they might be objectively superior to the inter-
nally generated knowledge. Hence, managers should be made aware that their preference for 
their own ideas and projects might originate from the labor required in order to become 
project leaders; in this way failures might be prevented, since coworkers or costumers may 
not always share their opinion (cf. Norton 2009). 
Trophies and  awards can  substantially influence people’s utility. Economic status models 
suggest that obtaining an award enhances relative standing, leading to an increase in winners’ 
effort and a decrease in losers’ effort (Auriol and Renault 2008), especially in the context of a 
zero-sum game. For instance, in a group of employees, those who are awarded (“winners”) 
might deliver better work results whereas those who come away empty-handed (“losers”) 
might reveal a measureable downturn in achievement motivation. However, the empirical 
findings offered by Neckermann et al. (2009) do not support this intuitive statement. Focusing 
on  employees of a financial services company,  they did  not find any negative effects of 
awards on the motivation of the non-rewarded. They found that those who did not get an 
award still saw the chance to receive one in the future, and therefore did not decrease their 
performance. While the chance of being awarded in the future is lacking in our experiment, 
our findings are not in line with Neckermann and his coauthors. In our trophy treatment, sub-
jects whose test results were below the median and who thus did not get an “award”, almost 
defiantly expressed a mean WTP of 0.57 € for the pen (which was worth 2.10 €), indicating 
that they did not regard the award as desirable. 
In line with our reverse trophy effect, Norton et al. (2010) also found an antithesis to their 
IKEA effect. They showed that labor increases valuation only if it is successful. Participants 
who failed in completing an origami bid significantly less on their work compared with the 
work of others’ origami. In our experiment, students who did not perform well in the mathe-
matics test refused to buy a pen afterwards, which could remind them of their underperfor-
mance. Unsuccessful labor leads to negative feelings and regret (Savitsky et al. 1997), thereby 
not increasing but rather decreasing the valuation for an item. Successful completion can thus 
be considered as a crucial element to the linkage between labor and liking. In this context, 13 
 
some studies stress the motivational advantages of instructions that employees feel able to 
follow (e.g., Grant and Parker 2009). This avoids frustration. 
According to these findings, companies should be diligent in creating tasks that are characte-
rized by a balanced relationship between customers’ effort and their extra utility associated 
with the performed labor to get the product (cf. Dellaert and Stremersch 2005).  
Further research is needed to analyze the conditions under which and to what extent the tro-
phy and the reverse trophy effects can be observed in the field. We claim that these effects are 
not just relevant for trophies in the narrow sense of the word (e.g., tennis trophies). They can 
also be found to influence markets of other goods that are obtained by successful work. And 
obtaining a good for one’s good work seems to be a pretty usual event to us. 14 
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